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THE BRONX HOUSEHOLD OF FAITH: LOOKING AT THE 
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 
In Bronx Household ol Faith v. Board ol Education ol the Citv of 
. I . . . . 
New York (Bronx Household If), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
recognized that "[t]he American experiment has flourished largely free 
of the religious strife that has stricken other societies because church and 
state have respected each other's autonomy."2 Additionally. the 
American experiment has flourished in a general sense because it allows 
for a "marketplace of ideas" through the free expression and debate of 
thoughts and viewpoints. 3 In recent years, both of these notions have 
been tested and redefined through the legal process-a process that has 
generated many unanswered questions and produced substantial conflicts 
in the judicial system. Specifically, appellate courts throughout the 
United States have differed on the question of whether "speech can be 
excluded from a limited public forum on the basis of the religious nature 
of the speech."4 In the wake of this conflict, courts have left the 
American people with important questions regarding the relationship 
between church and state and permissible limitations on religious speech 
in public fora. 
Nowhere has the balance between free expression and separation of 
church and state become more tenuous than in the public school setting. 
I. l3ronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. (Bronx Hous~hold II). 331 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 
2003). 
2. !d. at 355. 
3. For an interesting look at religious viewpoints being banned from the marketplace of ideas 
in an academic setting. sec John W. Hamilton. Bishop v. Aronov: Religion-tainted Vintpoints ar~ 
Bannu/ji-om the Marketplace of/dew·. 49 WASH. & LH' L. RLV. 1557 ( 1992) 
4. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98. I 05-06 (200 I): com[Hll"<' Cicntala \. 
Tucson. 244 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2001) (en bane) (holding that a city properly refused National Day 
of Prayer organizers' application to the city's civic events ti.md for coverage of costs for city 
services), Campbell v. St. Tammany's Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a 
school's policy against permitting religious instruction in its limited public f()rum did not constitute 
viewpoint discrimination), and l3ronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Seh. Dist. No. I 0 (lfmnx 
Household/). 127 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 1997) (concluding that a ban on religious sel"\ices and 
instruction in the limited public forum was constitutional), ll"ith Church on the Rock\". Albuquerque. 
84 F.3d 1273 (lOth Cir. 1996) (holding that a city's denial of permission to show the film JI!.IUS in a 
senior center was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination), and Good News/Good Sports Club v. 
Sch. Dist., 2X F.3d 1501 (llth Cir. 1994) (holding unconstitutional a school usc policy that prohibited 
Good News Club from meeting during times when the l3oy Scouts could meet). 
153 
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In 200 I, the Supreme Court's decision in Good News Club v. Milj(Jrd 
Central School attempted to clarify some of the conflicts between 
appellate courts on this issue by holding that restrictions in a limited 
public forum against an organization with a religious viewpoint violated 
the First Amendment's Free Speech clause. 5 In spite of the Supreme 
Court's attempt, the Second Circuit's opinion in Bronx Household If, 
which relied principally on reasoning in the Good Ne>vs Club decision, 
shows that many important issues remain unresolved, particularly 
whether a court could ever "identify a form of religious worship that is 
divorced from the teaching of moral values" and whether "the state, 
without imposing its own views on religion, ~could] define which values 
are morally acceptable and which are not.") How the Supreme Court 
chooses to resolve these questions in the future will "no doubt have 
profound implications for relations between church and state." 7 
Part I of this article discusses the three fora of expression recognized 
by the United States Supreme Court and the standards governing 
restrictions on speech in each type. Part II traces some of the Supreme 
Court's precedents regarding use of school property for religious 
purposes and presentation of religious viewpoints. Part Ill discusses and 
analyzes the principal unresolved issue identified by the Bronx 
Household II court that remains after the Supreme Court's decision in 
Good News Club, namely whether courts may draw a permissible 
distinction between religious viewpoint and religious worship in a 
limited public forum. This section concludes by arguing that, in the wake 
of Good News Club, the Bronx Household II opinion shows that a court's 
ability to identify a form of "religious worship, divorced from any 
teaching of moral values," 8 and thus permit its exclusion from a limited 
public forum, is both unlikely and potentially problematic in practical 
application. 
I. TYPES OF EXPRESSIVE FORA 
The First Amendment guarantees individuals the right to express 
ideas and thoughts while on public property-even when the expression 
5. Good News Club. 533 U.S at 120. 
6. Bronx Household II. 331 F.3d at 355. 
7. !d. Since the Second Circuit's 2002 ruling in Bmnx Household II. more than two dozen 
churches and religious groups now hold religious services in New York City public school buildings. 
primarily because the schools offer a more affordable alternative to other potential facilities. See 
Benjamin Weiser & Susan Saulny, On Sundays, Hymn Books Replace Text Hooks in City Schools. 
N.Y. TlMES, Feb. 6. 2005. ~ I, at 25. available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005102/06/nyregion/ 
06church.html. 
8. Bronx 1/ouscho/d II, 331 F.3d at 354. 
1] THE BRONX HOUSEHOLD OF FAITH 155 
is religious in nature. 9 Expression, however, may occasionally be limited 
by the government who, like a private property owner, may regulate 
speech and preserve property for the use to which it is dedicated. 10 
Whether a particular restriction on speech or activity is permissible 
depends on the nature of the forum where the expressive activity takes 
place. 11 In Perry Education Ass 'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass 'n, 12 
the Supreme Court set forth three types of expressive fora and explained 
the standards for regulation of speech in each of them. 13 
A. Traditional Public Forum 
The first category of public property where expression may take 
place is the traditional public forum. Traditional public fora include 
property such as "streets, parks, and places that 'by long tradition ... 
have been devoted to assembly and debate."' 14 In a traditional public 
forum, the government may occasionally restrict speech based on its 
subject matter, but such regulations are '"subject to the highest scrutiny' 
and 'survive onll if they are narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling 
state interest."' 1 Restrictions on viewpoint are never constitutional in 
this type of forum. 16 
B. Limited Public Forum 
The second category of public property is a limited public forum. 
The government creates a limited public forum when it intentionally 
designates "a place or channel of communication for use by the public at 
large for assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the 
9. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 390--91 (1993) 
(citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund. Inc., 473 U.S. 788. 800 (1985)); see also 
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 ( 1981) (citing Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 ( 1981 )); Nicmotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 ( 1951 ); Saia v. 
N.Y., 334 U.S. 558 ( 1948); Laura Gastel. Is Good News No News fiJr Estahlishment Clause 
Theon". 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 125, 133 (2002); Jason E. Manning, Good News Club v. Milford 
Central School: Viewpoint Discrimination or Endorsement ol Religion", 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
833, 851 (2003 ). 
10. Gastel, supra note 9, at 129. 
II. See Rebecca A. Valk, Good News Club v. Milford Central School: A Critical Analysis of 
the Estahlishment Clause as Applied to Puhlic Education, 17 ST. JOliN'S 1. LlCiAL COMMENT. 347, 
351 (2003). 
12. 460US 37(1984) 
13. !d. at 45--47; see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. 
14. Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10 (Bronx Household f). 127 F.3d 207. 
211 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Perry,460 U.S. at45). 
15. !d. (quoting lnt'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 
(1992)) 
16. Gastel. supra note 9, at 130. 
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discussion of certain subjects." 17 In a limited public forum, the 
government may permissibly reserve the forum for certain speakers and 
topics; however, any restrictions on speech may not discriminate on the 
basis of viewpoint and must be reasonable in light of the purpose of the 
forum. 18 Governmental limitations on use of the forum are subject only 
to minimal constitutional scrutiny when the proposed uses fall outside of 
the purposes of the limited forum. 19 To determine whether a limited 
public forum exists, courts generally look to policy, practice, and the 
f h 0 20 nature o t e property at Issue. 
C. Nonpublic Forum 
The third and final category of public property is the nonpublic 
forum. A nonpublic forum is state-owned property that "has not been 
opened for public speech either by tradition or by designation." 21 In this 
type of forum, the government may restrict access "on the basis of 
subject matter and speaker identity."2 
II. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS DISCUSSING RELIGIOUS SPEECH IN A 
PUBLIC SCHOOL SETTING 
The Supreme Court has encountered several cases that illustrate the 
difficulty in developing methods and rules for distinguishing between 
religious worship and religious viewpoint. Without clear guidelines, it is 
difficult for schools, particularly schools characterized as providing 
limited public forums, to assess whether their actions are in violation of 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
A. Widmar v. Vincent 
Widmar v. Vincent, 23 a 1981 opinion, was the first United States 
Supreme Court case involving access to school facilities by religious 
groups. 24 In that case, the University of Missouri at Kansas City granted 
17. Cornelius. 473 U.S. at 802. 
18. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001) (citing Rosenberger 
v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 ( 1995)). 
19. Bmnx flouschold I. 127 F.3d at 212 (citing Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton, 95 F.3d 224. 
229(2dCir. 1996)) 
20. Valk. supra note II. at 354 (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802). 
21. Bronx llouseho!d I, 127 F.3d at 212 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Educators' Ass'n .. 
460 U.S. 37.46 ( 19H4)). 
22. Parv, 460 U.S. at 49. 
23. 454 U.S. 263 ( I'JH I). 
24. Michael D. Baker. Protecting Religious Speakers' Access to l'uhlic School Facilities: 
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permission for over one hundred student clubs, including a religious 
group named Cornerstone, to conduct club meetings in school 
facilities. 25 After four years of allowing the club to meet on campus, the 
university revoked Cornerstone's permission to usc school facilities 
pursuant to a regulation that prohibited the use of university buildings 
'"for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching. "'26 The district 
court upheld the regulation, finding that "it was not on!~ justified, but 
required" by the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. 7 
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court and held that the 
regulation was an impermissible content-based restriction against 
religious speech, which the university failed to justify by compelling 
means. 
28 The court also held that the Establishment Clause is not 
offended by allowing a religious group to meet on a university campus 
when facilities are open to a wide variety of groups and speakers. 29 To 
the contrary, the primary effect of an equal-access policy would not 
advance religion, but would further students' intellectual curiosity and 
. I 30 soc1a awareness. 
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit, 
reasoning that the university had created a forum generally open to 
student groups. 31 Having done so, it was required to justify its exclusion 
of a student group that wished to engage in religious worship and 
discussion by a compelling state interest. 32 The court described the 
State's asserted interest in preventing an Establishment Clause violation 
as possibly "compelling," but ultimately concluded, after applying the 
Lemon test, that an equal access policy would not offend the 
Establishment Clause. 33 Since the university opened its facilities to a 
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches School District, 44 CASE W. RES. L. RI'V. 315,317 (1993). 
25. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265. 
26. !d. (quoting university regulation 4.0314.0107, adopted by the 13oard of Curators in llJ72). 
27. !d. at 263; Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907 (W.O. Mo. llJ7'!) 
2g. Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1316 (Hth Cir. 1980). 
2lJ. /d. at 1317. 
30. !d. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Widmar, Congress passed the Equal 
Access Act, Pub. L. No. 9g-377, 9R Stat. 1302 (codified at 20 U.S.C. ~~ 4071-4074 (2000)), which 
requires school districts that receive federal money and allow noncurricu1ar activities and club 
meetings in their facilities to grant similar access to students who wish to hold religious meetings in 
the schools. The constitutionality of the Equal Access Act was upheld in Hoard of" Education of the 
Westside Communi(r School v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990). KERN ALLXAt-;DER & 1\1. DA\ID 
ALEXANDER. AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 22H (6th ed. 2005). 
31. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269. 
32. !d. at 270. 
33. !d. at 271; see also Lemon v. Kurtzman. 403 U.S. 602, 612- 13 ( 1971 ). The Lemon Test 
requires that: (I) "the statute must have a secular legislative purpose." /d. at 612: (2) "its principal or 
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion." !d. (citing Bd. of Educ. \ 
Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)): and (3) "[it] must not foster 'an excessive government 
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wide variety of student groups, it could not exclude certain groups solely 
because of the content of their speech. 34 The court eventually held that 
the State's asserted interest in preventing an Establishment Clause 
violation was not sufficiently compelling to justify its content-based 
d. . . . 15 1scnmmat10n. · 
B. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District 
In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 36 
the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether it was a violation 
of "the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment ... to deny a church 
access to school premises to exhibit for ... assertedly reli?Jous purposes, 
a film series dealing with family and child rearing issues." 7 In this case, 
the local school board adopted a regulation allowing outside groups to 
use school facilities for social, civic, or recreational uses, but not for 
"religious purposes."38 Lamb's Chapel, a local church, sought to use 
school facilities to show a film series about child rearing from a Christian 
. 39 perspective. 
The district court characterized the school's facilities as a limited 
public forum 40 and stated that once this type of forum is opened to a 
particular type of speech, "selectively denying access to other activities 
of the same genre is forbidden." 41 However, because the school district 
here had never opened its facilities for religious purposes, the denial was 
viewpoint neutral and did not violate the Free Speech Clause. 42 The 
Second Circuit affirmed "in all respects. "43 
The United States Supreme Court recognized that the government 
can regulate subject matter and speaker identity on public property 
designated as a limited public forum '"so long as the distinctions drawn 
are reasonable in l~ht of the purpose served by the forum and are 
viewpoint neutral."' The Supreme Court reversed the district court and 
entanglement with religion."' !d. at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 ( 1970)). 
34. Widmar. 454 U.S. at 273. 
35. ld at 276. 
36. 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
37. !d. at 387. 
38. !d. 
39. ld 
40. !d. at 389. In viewpoint discrimination cases--especially those involving public schools-
the type of forum involved is generally not highly disputed. Manning, supra note 9, at 851. 
41. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 389. 
42. !d. at 390. 
43. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381, 389 (2d Cir. 1992). 
44. Lamb's Chapel, 508 US. at 392-93 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. 
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)). 
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Second Circuit, holding that the "religious purposes" exclusion failed 
. 45 
this test. 
The Second Circuit mischaracterized the issue in holding that the 
exclusionary rule was viewpoint neutral since it would be applied to all 
groups seeking to use the school property for religious purposes. 46 The 
proper inquiry, according to the Supreme Court, was "whether it 
discriminates on the basis of viewpoint to permit school property to be 
used for the presentation of all views about family issues and child 
rearing exce~t those dealing with the subject matter from a religious 
viewpoint. " 4 The court reasoned that because presentations about 
family values and child rearing issues were clearly within the scope of 
permissible uses already allowed by the forum, the denial of the church's 
presentation was based solely on the fact that it was from a religious 
perspective. 48 The court held this to be impermissible viewpoint 
discrimination, forbidden in a limited public forum setting. 49 The court 
also rejected the school district's argument that this distinction was 
required to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. 50 
C. Good News Club v. Milford Central School 
Pursuant to state law, 51 the school in Good News Club v. Milford 
Central Schoo/52 adopted a policy of permissible uses for its faciliti~s. 53 
Specifically, the policy made the school facilities available for "'social, 
civic, and recreational meetings and entertainments, and other uses 
pertaining to the welfare of the community."'54 The policy, however, 
prohibited use "by any individual or organization for religious 
"55 purposes. 
The Good News Club, a Christian organization for children ages six 
to twelve, sought permission to use school facilities to hold its weekly 
afterschool meetings, which consisted of singing songs, saying prayers, 
hearing a Bible lesson, and playing games. 56 The district superintendent 
45. /d. at 393. 
46. !d. 
4 7. /d. 
48 hi. 
49. l.amh 's Chap!'!. 508 US. at 394 (citing Cornl!!ius. 473 U.S. at 806). 
50. !d at 395. 
51. N.Y. Educ. Law~ 414 (McKinney 2000). 
52. 533 U.S. 98 (200 I). 
53. ld at 98, I 02. 
54. !d at I 02. 
55. ld at I 03. 
56. ld 
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reviewed the club's activities and concluded that they "were not a 
discussion of secular subjects such as child rearing, development of 
character, and development of morals from a religious ~erspective, but 
were in fact the equivalent of religious instruction itself." 7 
Although the club was granted a preliminary injunction that allowed 
them temporary use of the facilities, this was eventually vacated, and 
Milford Central School was given summary judgment. sx A divided panel 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, 
holding that, because the subject matter of the club's activities was 
''quintessentially religious" and its activities fell "outside the bounds of 
pure 'moral and character development,"' the school's exclusionary 
P?lic~ . w~s ~ermissible content discrimination, not viewpoint 
thscnmmatwn. · 
Due to the parties' stipulation, the United States Supreme Court 
analyzed the free speech issue in the context of a limited open forum. 60 
Finding the facts of this case indistinguishable from Lamb's Chapel and 
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 61 the court 
determined that exclusion of the club was impermissible viewpoint 
discrimination. 62 Since the forum had been opened to discussion of a 
wide variety of topics such as the teaching of morals and character 
development, as well as events pertaining to the welfare of the 
community, exclusion of the Good News Club-who also taught morals 
and character development-was based on the religious viewpoint it 
63 
espoused. 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Second Circuit's assessment 
that the club was "doing something other than simply teaching moral 
values." 64 The Supreme Court found that the Second Circuit erred in 
characterizing the Christian viewpoint as unique because it contains "an 
additional layer" that other viewpoints do not-"teaching children how 
to cultivate their relationship with God through Jesus Christ"-which the 
court called "quintessentially religious."65 The Supreme Court further 
opposed the argument that something '"quintessentially religious' or 
57. (;ood .V~l\'1 Cluh. 533 U.S. at I 04. 
58. Ciood News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 21 F. Supp. 2d 147, 161 (N.D.N.Y. 1998). 
59. Ciood News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 510-511 (2d Cir. 2000) 
60. Good Nc\\·s Cluh. 533 U S at I Oil. 
61 515 U.S. Xl9 (1995) (holding that a university's refusal to fund a student newspaper 
solely because the publication addressed issues from religious viewpoint violated the Free Speech 
Clause). 
62. ( ;uod Sell.\ Club. 533 U.S. at I 09 I 0. 
63. ld 
64. ld at II I (citing Good News C/uh. 202 F.3d at 51 0). 
h5. !d at Ill (citing Good News Cluh. 202 F.3d at 509-10). 
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'decidedly religious in nature' cannot also be characterized properly as 
the teachin~ of morals and character development from a particular 
viewpoint." 6 According to the Supreme Court, the incorrect "unstated 
principle" of the Second Circuit's reasoning was "its conclusion that any 
time religious instruction and prayer are used to discuss morals and 
character
7 
the discussion is simply not a 'pure' discussion of those 
issues." 6 The Supreme Court reaffirmed its holdings in Lamb's Chapel 
and Rosenberger that "speech discussing otherwise permissible subjects 
cannot be excluded from a limited public forum on the ground that the 
subject is discussed from a religious viewpoint"68 As such, Milford's 
refusal to allow the club to use its facilities was impermissible viewpoint 
discrimination. 69 The court also rejected Milford's contention that even 
if it had engaged in viewpoint discrimination, such action was necessary 
to avoid an Establishment Clause violation. 70 
Justice Souter's dissent described the club's activities not as a "mere 
discussion of a subject from a particular, Christian point of view," but as 
"an evangelical service of worship," where the "unsaved" children are 
invited to receive Jesus as their savior from sin and the "saved" children 
are challenged to "ask God for the strength and the 'want' ... to obey 
him."71 In footnote four of the majority's opinion, the court agreed that 
Justice Souter's recitation of the club's activities was accurate. 72 
However, the majority responded that "regardless of the label Justice 
Souter wishes to use, what matters is the substance of the club's 
activities, which we conclude are materially indistinguishable from the 
activities in Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger." 73 In those cases, like in 
Good News Club, religion is the viewpoint or foundation from which the 
speaker's ideas are conveyed. 74 
66. Good Ne11·s C/uh, 533 U.S. at Ill (citing Good News Club, 202 F.3d at 512 (Jacobs, J., 
dissenting)). 
67. 1d 
6R. ld at 112. 
69. ld 
70. ld The Court also noted that although in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,271 (1981), it 
had hinted that a state interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation "may be characterized 
as compelling" to the degree that it would justify content-based discrimination, the Court had not 
decided whether a state's interest in preventing an Establishment Clause violation would justify 
,·iewpoint discrimination. The Court declined to answer that question here since it concluded that the 
school "has no valid Establishment Clause interest" that would justify the exclusion. Good News 
Cluh, 533 U.S. at 113. 
71. Good News Cluh, 533 U.S. at 137-38 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
72. !d. at 112 n.4 (majority opinion). 
73. !d. 
74. !d. 
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D. Bronx Household of Faith v. Community School District No. I 0 
(Bronx Household I) 
I. United States District Court for the Southern District ofNew York 
(1996/5 . . 
Pursuant to New York state law, 76 the Board of Education of the 
City of New York adopted standard operating procedures for the use of 
school buildings. Among the many permitted uses are "instruction in any 
branch of education" and "social, civic and recreational meetings ... and 
other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community." 77 In addition, the 
Standard Operating Procedures manual restricts use so that "no 
outside . . . group may be allowed to conduct religious services or 
religious instruction on school premises after school. However, the use of 
school premises by outside ... groups after school for the purposes of 
discussing religious material or material which contains a religious 
. . . . 'bl "78 v1ewpomt ... IS permiSSI e. 
The Bronx Household of Faith sought to rent space in Anne Cross 
Merseau Middle School to hold Sunday morning worship 79 meetings 
consisting of "h~mn singing, communion, Bible reading, Bible preaching 
and teaching." l When its initial application to rent the school was 
denied in 1994 on the grounds that its intended use would violate the 
religious services and instruction policy, the church filed suit in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 81 
The court first concluded that the school had created a limited public 
forum. 82 In this context, the exclusionary policy was reasonably related 
to the school's legitimate interest in "preserving and prioritizing access" 
to the school primarily for educational purposes, and secondarily, for 
public and community activities. 83 The district court granted summary 
judgment for the Board of Education and dismissed Bronx Household's 
75. Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Seh. Dist. No. I 0. 1996 U.S. Dist. LEX IS 111044 
(S.DNYI996) 
76. N.Y. Educ. Law~ 414 (McKinney 1995). 
77. !d. 
7X. Bronx llotisehold of Faith, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEX IS 18044, at **3·4 (citing N.Y. City Bd. 
ofEduc .. Standard Operating Procedures~ 5.11 (formerly~ 5.9)). 
79. !d at *2. 
80. Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. I 0 (Bronx Household 1), 127 F.3d 207, 
211 (2d Cir. 1997) 
XI. Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10. 1996 US Dist. LEXIS 18044 
(S.D NY 1996). 
82. !d at * 15. 
X3. ld at* 18. 
1] 
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2. United States Court ofAppeals for the Second Circuit (1997/5 
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After being dismissed in district court, the case went to the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals where the district court's decision to dismiss 
the complaint was affirmed. 86 The Second Circuit distinguished 
"between discrimination against speech because of its subject matter, 
considered permissible to preserve the purposes of the limited forum, and 
viewpoint discrimination, considered impermissible if directed against 
speech within the limitations of the forum." 87 Thus, the court held that 
the exclusionary policy "preserves that distinction by prohibiting 
religious worship and religious instruction by outside groups, a 
prohibition that state authorities consider necessary to preserve the 
purposes of the limited public school forum, and by specifically 
permitting religious viewpoint speech in relation to matters for which the 
public school forum is open." 88 
The court recognized that although a film like the one in Lamb's 
Chapel would have been allowed under the use policy because it treats a 
subject already permitted in the forum, Lamb's Chapel did not foreclose 
a school from limiting subjects in its forum as long as the restrictions 
were reasonable and viewpoint neutral. 89 With that backdrop, the court 
found that the school acted reasonably in not wanting to be identified 
with a particular church. 90 Also, the court held the exclusion to be 
viewpoint neutral because it had never opened the forum specifically to 
religious worship services. 91 The court found it permissible to draw a 
distinction between religious worship/instruction on one hand, and 
discussion of secular subjects from a religious viewpoint on the other. 92 
In a petition to the United States Supreme Court, Bronx Household was 
d . d . . 91 eme cert10ran. -
84. !d. at * 19. 
85. Bronx Household I. 127 F.3d at 207. 
86. 1d at 21 7. 
87. !d. at 213. 
88. !d. 
89. !d. at 21 1-12. 
90. !d. at 214. 
91. !d. 
92. !d. at 215. 
93. Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. I 0, 523 US. I 074, I 074 (1998). 
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E. Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Education of the City of 
New York (Bronx Household!!) 
I. United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
~~w . . 
After the Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Good News Cluh v. 
Milford Central School, 95 Bronx Household again applied to rent the 
school, and again its application was denied. 96 Accordingly, Pastors Hall 
and Roberts sought a preliminary injunction in district court, arguing that 
the Good News Club decision had overruled the Second Circuit's ruling 
in Bronx Household I. 97 In this second proceeding, the Bronx Household 
provided more details about its intended use of the forum than in the 
previous litigation: "the singing of Christian hymns and songs, prayer, 
fellowship with other church members and Biblical preaching and 
teaching, communion, shari~f of testimonies and social fellowship 
among the church members." As already shown, Bronx Household had 
previously requested that it rent the school for "h~mn singing, 
communion, Bible reading, Bible preaching and teaching." 9 
Bronx Household also emphasized that it "seek[s] to give honor and 
praise to ... Jesus Christ in everything we do. To that end we sing songs 
and hymns of praise to our Lord. We read the Bible and the pastors teach 
from it because it tells us about God, what He wants us to do and how we 
should live our lives." 10° Finally, Bronx Household emphasized the 
importance of its Sunday morning meeting because "[i]t provides the 
theological framework to engage in activities that benefit the welfare of 
the community." 101 The meeting allowed the church to reaffirm its 
commitment to help the needy among the community and their 
congregation and to provide counseling for those with problems. 102 
In analyzing Bronx Household's free speech claim, the court began 
94. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 2d 401 (S D.N.Y 2002). 
95. 533 U.S. 9R (2001). 
96. Bronx Household ofFaith, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 409. 
97. See id. at 411. As an interesting side note, Pastors Hall and Roberts commenced this 
action on September 10, 2001, the day before the tragic events at the World Trade Center in New 
York City. Although the court relies on the reasoning of the newly-decided Good News Cluh 
decision for its holding, the political and social climate of the time was certainly more favorable to 
religious groups than during the previous litigation when access was denied. 
98. !d. at 410. 
99. Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. I 0 (Bronx Household/). 127 F.3d 207. 
215 (2d Cir. 1997). 
I 00. Bronx Hous<'hold ofFaith, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 410. 
101. !d. 
102. !d. 
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by noting that the Supreme Court in Good News Cluh specifically 
mentioned the Bronx Household I decision among the appellate court 
decisions that conflicted '"on the question of whether speech can be 
excluded from a limited public forum on the basis of the religious nature 
of the speech."' 103 The Supreme Court in Good News Club had 
disagreed with the Bronx Household I court regarding the fact that the 
'"characterization of the club's activities as religious in nature warranted 
treating the club's activities as different in kind from the other activities 
permitted by the school."' 104 Striking down the Second Circuit's belief 
that a distinction could permissibly be drawn between religious worship 
services and other forms of speech from a religious viewpoint, the 
Supreme Court had called such attempts "quixotic" when the subject 
matter is character development and moral teaching. 105 The school, in 
the context of a limited public forum, could not restrict activities that 
although '"quintessentially religious,"' were not '"mere religious 
h . d. df h. f I I "' 106 wors 1p, 1vorce rom any teac mg o mora va ues. 
The court found that, like the activities in Good News Club, the 
activities in Bronx Household could not be characterized as "'mere 
religious worship, divorced from any teaching of moral values,"' and as 
such could not be excluded from the limited public forum because of 
their religious nature. 107 While the court noted that some of the church's 
activities, if conducted alone, such as communion or prayer, could be 
considered "mere religious worship," 108 the court declined to separate 
Bronx Household's individual activities into distinct speech 
categories. 109 Instead, the court found that the church's activities were 
consistent with activities expressly permitted in the forum, such as 
"social, civic, and recreational meetings ... and other uses pertaining to 
the welfare of the community." 110 Such activities as providing the needy 
with food and clothing and counseling those with financial and emotional 
103. !d. at413 (quoting Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 105 (2001)). 
I 04. !d. at 413 (quoting Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 110--11 ). 
105. !d. at 413 (quoting Good News Club, 202 F.3d at 512 (Jacobs, J., dissenting)). 
106. Bronx Household of Faith, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 413 (quoting Good News Club, 533 U.S. 
111.112n.4). 
107. !d. at 414. 
108. !d. 
109. !d at 413-15. Justice Stevens' dissent in Good Ne11·s Club. 533 U.S. 98, 128-133 (2001), 
proposes separating religious speech into three categories: (I) religious speech that is simply speech 
about a particular topic from a religious point of view, (2) religious speech that amounts to worship, 
or its equivalent, (3) speech that is aimed principally at proselytizing or inculcating belief in a 
particular religious faith. Justice Stevens would find it permissible in a limited public form, such as 
was found in Good News Cluh and Bronx Household(){ Faith, to exclude the last two categories of 
speech, while allowing the first. 
110. N.Y. Educ. Law~ 414 (McKinney 2000). 
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problems pertain to the welfare of the community. 111 Furthermore
2 
singing, eating, and socializing are clearly recreational activities. 11 
Teaching church members to "love their neighbors as themselves" and to 
help the poor can be fairly classified as teaching moral values. 113 
The court found these facts to be "squarely within the Supreme 
Court's precise holding in Good News Club: the activities are not limited 
to 'mere religious worship' but include activities benefiting the welfare 
of the community . . . and other activities that are consistent with the 
defined purposes of the limited public forum." 114 The testimony of 
Pastor Hall that "the Sunday morning meeting . . . provides the 
theological framework to engage in activities that benefit the welfare of 
the community" shows that Bronx Household engaged in these permitted 
activities from a religious viewpoint. 115 
The court also rejected the school's contention that worship is an 
activity different in kind from other activities allowed by the forum 
because it contains elements of ceremony and ritual that other activities 
do not. 116 Here, the court observed that many permitted groups that use 
the facilities to convey particular viewpoints, such as the Boy Scouts and 
Legionaries, employ ceremony and ritual during their meetings. 117 
Finally, the court commented that even if worship were an activity 
different in kind from other activities permitted in the forum, an attempt 
to distinguish between religious content and viewpoint where morals and 
the welfare of the community is involved is not only "quixotic," but also 
raises issues of excessive government entanglement with religion. 11 x The 
district court granted a preliminary injunction against the school to 
prevent them from denying Bronx Household use of the facilities to 
d h . h' . 119 con uct t e1r wors 1p services. 
2. United States Court ofAppealsfor the Second Circuit (2003) 120 
Following the district court's preliminary injunction, the Board of 
Education appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 121 After 
I I I. Bronx Household ojFaith, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 4 I4-I 5. 
I I2. !d. 
II3. /dat4I4. 
I I4. !d. at414-15. 
115. /d.at415. 
I I 6. Bronx Household of Faith. 226 F. Supp. 2d at 415. 
117. ld.at416-17. 
II X. !d. at 421-23. 
119. !d. at 427. 
120. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. (Bronx Household If). 331 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 
2003). 
I21. !d. at 346. 
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recitin~ the extensive procedural history of the Bronx Household f 
case, 
1 
the court again analyzed the church's claim that the school had 
violated its Free Speech rights under the First Amendment by excluding 
a group seeking to rent the school premises for purposes of "religious 
services or instruction," while allowing most other community groups to 
rent the school. 12J Since the Board of Education appealed from a grant 
of a preliminary injunction by a trial court, the court reviewed the trial 
court's decision to determine whether it had abused its discretion. 124 
The court ultimately agreed with the trial court that the plaintiffs 
were likely to establish that the defendants violated their First 
Amendment Free Speech rights because of the factual parallels between 
the activities in Good News Club and the activities at issue in this 
case.
125 The court noted that "the majority in Good News Club 
characterized the club's activiti as 'the teaching of morals and character 
from a particular viewpoint,"' 26 but also agreed with Justice Souter's 
characterization ofthe club's activities as involvin~ not only teaching but 
also an '"evangelical service of worship."' 12 In prohibiting the 
exclusion of the club from the forum as a violation of the Free Speech 
clause, the majority simply observed that the activities at issue were not 
"mere religious worship, divorced from any teaching of moral values." 
128 
Determining that Bronx Household's activities were more than just 
worship, the court found that there was "no principled basis upon which 
to distinguish the activities set out by the Supreme Court in Good News 
Club from the activities that the Bronx Household of Faith has proposed 
for its Sunday meetings" at the school. 129 Like the Good News Club, 
Bronx Household "combine[ d] preaching and teaching with such 
'quintessentially religious' elements as prayer, the singing of Christian 
songs, and communion." 130 The church's meetings also contained 
secular elements like the fellowship meal, which gave members a chance 
to discuss individual problems and needs. On the basis of these facts, the 
court concluded that "it cannot be said that the meetings of the Bronx 
Household constitute only religious worship, separate and apart from any 
122. /d. at 345-4 7. 
123. /d. at 353 57. 
124. !d. at 34~. 
125. !d. at 354. 
126. ld (quoting Good News Club v. Milford Cent. SelL 533 U.S. 9X. Ill (200 I)). 
127. ld (quoting Good Nell's Cluh. 533 US. at 138 (Souter. J .• dissenting)). 
128. ld (quoting Good News Cluh, 533 US. at 112 n.4 (majority orinion)). 
129. !d. 
130. ld 
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teaching ofmoral values." 131 Since the Board of Education had allowed 
other groups to teach moral and character development on school 
grounds, it could not exclude the church from its forum on the ground 
that those same topics were being presented from a religious 
. . 132 
v1ewpomt. 
In concluding the discussion of Bronx Household's Free Speech 
claim, the court noted several unresolved issues that remain in the wake 
of Good News Club: 
(1) Would [a court] be able to identify a form of religious worship that 
is divorced from the teaching of moral values? (2) Should [a court] 
continue to evaluate activities that include religious worship on a case-
by-case basis, or should worship no longer be treated as a distinct 
category of speech? (3) How does the distinction drawn in. . . earlier 
precedent between worship and other forms of speech from a religious 
viewpoint relate to the dichotomy suggested in Good News Club 
between "mere" worship on the one hand and worship that is not 
divorced from the teaching of moral values on the other? (4) How 
would a state, without imposing its own views on religion, define 
which values are morally acceptable and which arc not? And, if such a 
choice is impossible to make, would the state be required to permit the 
use of public school property by religious sects that preach ideas 
commonly viewed as hateful? (5) When several religious groups seck 
to use the same property at the same time, would not the state have to 
choose between them? What criteria would govern that choice? (6) In 
all of this process, i~ trere not a danger of excessive entanglement by 
the state in religion? 3 
Finally, the court concluded by rejecting the Board of Education's 
argument that Bronx Household's exclusion from the forum was 
necessary to prevent an Establishment Clause violation. 134 The court 
relied on the Supreme Court's failure to find a valid Establishment 
Clause interest as evidence of a similar lack of interest in Bronx 
Household, notin!f again the factual similarities between this case and 
Good News Club. 35 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Miner criticized the majority's 
conclusion that, based on the facts presented by Bronx Household's 
pastors, "it cannot be said that the meetings of the Bronx Household of 
Faith constitute only religious worship, separate and apart from any 
131. ld 
132. Id 
133. ld at 355 (numbering added). 
134. ld at 356. 
135. Id 
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teaching of moral values."' 136 Justice Miner reasoned that the majority 
relied on evidence produced in a "self-serving" letter and affidavit 
prepared by Bronx Household's pastors. 137 This letter, which Justice 
Miner hinted was carefully crafted with the assistance of counsel, 
"tellingly decline[s] to mention the church's intent to usc [school 
facilities] for worship services and instead attempts to persuade the 
rea~e: that .the c~ur~~,~~?ropose~ use ... [i~volvcd] instruction from a 
'rehg10us v1ewpomt. · Accordmg to the d1ssent, the court should have 
weighed the facts produced in Pastor Hall's deposition that "put to rest 
any doubts about whether the church's proposed meetings are anything 
but religious worship services." 139 Pastor Hall's deposition gives more 
detail about the structure of the Sunday services, the administration of 
communion, and the purpose of the meetings. 140 Based on Pastor Hall's 
deposition, the dissent found the facts of this case "'as different from 
Good News Club 'as night from day."' 141 
The dissent also agreed with the Bronx Household I holding, that 
"religious worship services could be prohibited from being held in public 
school buildings without running afoul of the Free Speech Clause 
remains good law." 142 In the dissent's view, the Supreme Court's ruling 
that "constitutionally meaningful distinctions could not be drawn 
between religious and secular viewpoints in the context of religious 
instruction" did not disturb the Bronx Household I holding. 143 According 
to the dissent, he Good News Club opinion did not address the religious 
worship question at issue here, and instead confined its analysis to the 
question of whether a group seeking to enga9e in religious instruction 
could be excluded from a limited public forum. 44 
The dissenting opinion concluded with Justice Miner emphasizing 
that he agreed with the majority's finding that a religious group wanting 
to teach moral and character development and desiring to hold meetings 
designed to benefit the welfare of the community, should not be excluded 
on the basis of its religious viewpoint, if the forum has allowed other 
groups to conduct the same activities. 145 However, he stated that he 




140. /d. at 360-61. 
141 /d. at 365 (quoting Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch, 533 U.S. 91\, 137 (2001) 
(Souter, J., dissenting)). 
142. /d. at 364-65. 
143. ld 
144. /d. 
145. ld at 366. 
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cannot abide the majority's leap of logic based on the [Church's] self-
serving statements that "their teaching comes from the viewpoint of the 
Bible" and their emphasis on the social and community aspects of the 
"meetings" of the church, their religious worship services are suddenly 
-h d . h -h I. . . . 146 trans1orme mto speec 1rom are IgJOus v1ewpomt. 
The dissent would hold that Bronx Household's activities were 
religious worship-"nothing more and nothing less"-and that its 
activities could still be excluded from a limited public forum following 
the Good News Cluh decision. 147 Finally, the dissent raised concerns 
about a possible Establishment Clause violation if Bronx Household 
were allowed to hold its worship services on the school property. 14~ 
III. UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS 
Although the Bronx Household II opinion presents several questions 
for reflection, many of those questions are simply different ways of 
characterizing the first inquiry presented in Good News Cluh: "Would [a 
court] be able to identify a form of religious worship that is divorced 
,- h h. t' I 1 '"' 149 P bl h. . . tTOm t e teac mg o mora va ues r resuma y, t IS question raises 
the issue of whether, based on the facts of a particular case, a court could 
identify "pure" religious worship that is divorced from the teaching of 
moral values, and thus constitutionally permit its exclusion from a 
limited public forum on the basis of its content. The Bronx Household 
court's apparent confusion on this issue stems from Justice Thomas's 
vague language in the Supreme Court's Good News Club decision. 150 
Althou~h the Bronx Household 11 court professed to be unclear on this 
issue, 1 analyzing the court's reasoning and holding in light ofthe Good 
News Club decision shows that the Second Circuit's purported confusion 
is somewhat unfounded. If the Bronx Household II court felt in some 
way "unguided" by Supreme Court precedent on this issue, its opinion 
does not appear to reflect this feeling of uncertainty. 
This question of identifying religious worship divorced from moral 
146. !d. 
147. !d 
!4X. !d at 366-6 7. 
149. It is interesting to note that the cout1. as evidence of the complexity of the i"ues that it is 
unable to resolve. pairs this question with such obviously unanswerable philosophical queries as. 
"How would [a] state, without imposing its own views on religion. dctlnc which values arc morally 
acceptable and which are not'1" /d. at 355. 
150. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 n.4 (2001 ). The fitct that Justice 
Thomas's vague language was found in a footnote instead of the body of the opinion may have 
fut1her contributed to the court's confusion about how much weight to give his statements. 
151. Bronx Household II, 331 F.3d at 355. 
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values comes from the majority's holding in Good News Cluh. 152 In that 
case, the Supreme Court found the Christian Club's social, moral, and 
religious activities to be indistinguishable from those in Lamb's Chapel 
and Rosenberger because the club sought to address an otherwise 
permissible subject~the teaching of morals and character~from a 
religious viewpoint. 153 Disagreeing with the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals that "something that is 'quintessentially religious' ... cannot 
also be characterized properly as the teaching of morals and character 
development from a particular viewpoint," 154 the Supreme Court 
concluded that "the club's activities do not constitute mere religious 
worship, divorced from any teaching of moral values." 155 Because the 
activities were not merely worship, the club's exclusion from the limited 
public forum was impermissible viewpoint discrimination. 156 
This conclusion by the Supreme Court is most significant for its 
implied message. Here, the court seems to be saying that had the club 
engaged in activities that could be characterized as "'mere religious 
worship, divorced from any teaching of moral values,'" a valid 
distinction could be drawn between pure religious worship and the 
expression of a religious viewpoint on otherwise permissible subjects. 157 
This would allow a court to exclude a group intending to use a limited 
public forum for worship on the basis of its content as long as religious 
worship had never been permitted in the forum. 158 In practical 
application, however, is it possible to distinguish between religious 
viewpoint and worship? If it is possible to draw a distinction, would a 
court be willing to do so? As shall be discussed below, the Bronx 
Household II opinion indicates that the court has already answered its 
own questions~it is neither possible nor likely. 
A. Bronx Household II Reasoning and Analysis 
I. District Court 
The district court m the initial Bronx Household I case held the 
school district's restrictions on religious worship to be both reasonable 
152. Good News Cluh, 533 U.S. at 1 12 n.4. 
153. /d. at 110-12. The fact that the club's activities were, according to the dissent and 
acknowledged by the majority, an "evangelical service of worship" had no bearing on the overall 
issue of whether the activities could be excluded from the forum. /d. at 13S. 
154. !d. at 1 1 1 . 
155. !d. at 112 n.4. 
156. Good News C/uh, 533 U.S. at 112. 
157. See Manning, supra note 9, at S70. 
158. See id 
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and viewpoint neutral. 159 With respect to viewpoint neutrality, the court 
drew a line between speech from a religious viewpoint, which the policy 
specifically allowed, and reli¥ious worship services, which had never 
been allowed in the forum. 60 Although the court recognized that 
religious worship services may be considered the ultimate form of speech 
from a religious viewpoint in an open forum, in the context of a limited 
public forum, a permissible distinction could be drawn between speech 
from a religious viewpoint and religious worship. 161 In the court's view, 
exclusion of religious worship services would be content discrimination, 
which is allowed in a limited public forum, and not impermissible 
viewpoint discrimination. 162 
The court not only found this distinction to be reasonable and 
viewpoint neutral, but it also found it easy to make the distinction 
between discussions of secular matters from a religious viewpoint-a 
characterization that presumably comes from its interpretation of the 
Supreme Court's holding in Lamb's Chapel-and religious worship. 163 
Thus, the court would restrict a religious group's use of the school's 
facilities to presentation of secular matters from a religious viewpoint, 
rather than more directly religious viewpoints-including that of 
worship-on both religious and secular subjects. 164 
Following the Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Good News Club, 
the district court began to sing a different tune regarding the distinction 
between religious worship and the presentation of religious viewpoints. 
Reviewing the Bronx Household I decision in a case involving the same 
issues and parties, the district court in Bronx Household II reached the 
opposite conclusion. 165 In so doing, the Bronx Household II court 
demonstrated the reality and force of the Good News Club's implied 
message that although it might be possible in theory to find a form of 
15lJ. Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10 (Bronx 1/ouseho/d 1), 127 F.3d 207, 
215 (2d Cir. \997). 
I 60. s~e id. at 214. The court found that it was reasonable for a state and school district to 
adopt a regulation that would avoid identifying a middle school with a particular church because of 
the consequences it would have on the minds of the children. Additionally, the court believed it to be 
a proper state function to decide the extent to which the school and church groups should remain 
separate. !d. 
I 6 I !d. at 215. 
\62. ld 
I 63. Bronx Household f. 127 F.3d at 215. Even Judge Cabrancs, the sole dissenter from the 
three-Judge panel, would uphold the ban on religious worship because such activity cannot be 
properly understood to be a vehicle for the presentation of both secular and religious viewpoints and 
is therefore a form of content exclusion, permissible in a limited public forum. !d. at 221 (Cabranes, 
J., dissenting). 
164. /d.at214. 
I 65. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 2d 40 I. 427 (S.D.N. Y. 2002 ). 
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religious worship that is divorced from the teaching of morals and 
character, in practice a court's ability and willingness to make this 
distinction is not only unlikely, but rather "quixotic." 166 Judge Jacob's 
Second Circuit dissent in Good News Club articulates this principle and 
demonstrates why its application to complex real-life situations is so 
difficult: 
The majority argues that the activities of the club are 
"quintessentially religious," while the other groups deal only with the 
"secular subject of morality." The fallacy of this distinction is that it 
treats morality as a subject that is secular by nature, which of course, it 
may be or not, depending on one's point of view. Discussion of morals 
and character from purely secular viewpoints of idealism, culture or 
general uplift will often appear secular, while discussion of the same 
issues from a religious viewpoint will often appear essentially-
quintessentially-religious. "There is no indication when 'singing 
hymns, reading scripture, and teaching biblical principles' cease to be 
'singing, teaching, and reading' -all apparently forms of 'speech,' 
despite their religious subject matter-and become unprotected 
'worship.'" 167 
Even the idea of being able to identify "in theory" a form of religious 
worship divorced from moral and character development is problematic. 
For example, would a group that desired to use Milford Central School's 
facilities to hold a simple prayer appealing to a higher being for 
assistance or to give thanks be excluded under the Good News Club 
holding? What about a group whose only activity consists of serving 
communion or performing a baptism? Because these activities do not 
expressly teach a moral lesson, a court might find that they constitute 
"pure worship," divorced from the teaching of moral values or character. 
However, it certainly could be argued that these forms of religious 
activities, although not expressly teaching moral or character 
development, could nevertheless serve as the foundation for the teaching 
of moral values or character development. 168 In the alternative, mere 
acknowledgement of a higher being or a person's dependence on such 
could of itself be considered a moral lesson. 169 
166. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 FJd 502, 512 (2d Cir. 2000) (Jacobs. J .. 
dissenting). 
167. /d. at 515 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 545 U.S. 263,269 n.6 (1981) (internal citation 
omitted)). 
16X. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, Ill (2001) ("What matters for 
purposes of the Free Speech Clause is that we can sec no logical difference in kind between the 
invocation of Christianity by the club and the invocation of teamwork, loyalty. or patriotism by other 
associations to provide a foundation for their lessons."). 
169. Judge Jacob's Second Circuit dissent in Good Nnn C/uh acknowledged the difficulty in 
174 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2007 
This approach is also problematic in the sense that it would require a 
court to determine on behalf of a religious group, in a way that is 
potentially contrary to the religious group's own sincerely held views, 
which forms of worship are cleanly separated from the teaching of moral 
values. For most groups and activities, it is safe to assume that such clean 
breaks cannot be readily made. If the group itself could not make this 
distinction, it is doubtful that a court, guided only by the limited 
perspective of written briefs and condensed oral arguments, could fairly 
make the distinction. Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Lee v. 
Weisman, 170 a school prayer case, succinctly evaluates this concern: "I 
can hardly imagine a subject less amenable to the competence of the 
federal judiciary, or more deliberately to be avoided where possible ... 
[than] comparative theology." 171 Rather than risking mistake, most 
courts will likely choose to "err on the side of free speech," 172 as was the 
case in Bronx Household JJ. 173 
Another related difficulty in making fine distinctions between 
worship and presentation of religious viewpoints~made very clear in the 
Bronx Household If opinion~results from the inherently broad and 
variable definition of worship itself. For example, although worship 
commonly connotes a religious activity, Pastor Hall, from The Bronx 
Household of Faith, presented a different perspective in his deposition to 
the court. 174 Pastor Hall acknowledged that "worship" is often linked to 
religious activity, but is not necessarily exclusively religious in 
nature.
175 In his view (and presumably that of many members of his 
congregation), worship is a "neutral" word, having neither a solely 
religious nor solely irreligious meaning; worship simply means "to 
ascribe worth to something." 176 
Used in the more neutral sense, Pastor Hall found no difficulty in 
stating that he worships athletic prowess, masterful works of art, and 
beautiful displays of nature, along with his "traditional" worship of Jesus 
distinguishing between religious content and viewpoint. In such instances, he argued, the court 
should "err on the side of free speech ... [since] [t]he concerns supporting free speech greatly 
outweigh those supporting regulation of the limited public forum." Good News Club v. Milford 
Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 515 (2d Cir. 2000) (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
170. 505 U.S. 577! 1992) 
I 71. ld at 616-17 (Souter, J ., concurring). 
172. Good News C!uh. 202 F.3d at 515 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
173. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. (Bronx Household/!), 331 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 
2003) 
174. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 2d 401, 421 (S.D. N.Y. 2002). 
175. ld 
I 76. !d. 
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Christ. 177 Here again, the difficulty courts have in dissecting the 
religious speech at issue is obvious. Worship-a seemingly clear term-
is not so clear after all in the context of individuals' particular religious 
views. On these grounds, the district court in Bronx Household II 
concluded that even if it were possible to distinguish religious viewpoint 
and religious worship, a court should not become entangled in such 
b. . d I . I . +: d ln su Jective an u t1mate y unsatis1actory en eavors. 
In any event, the Bronx Household II court's interpretation of Good 
News Club has made these fine speech distinctions now nearly irrelevant. 
The Bronx Household II court adopted not only the Good News Club 
majority's position but also the consequences of the rule's practical 
application; it is now nearly impossible for a court to distinguish between 
religious worship that contains moral and character development and 
worship that does not. 179 The effect of this is to ensure that all religious 
groups-even those seeking to use the forum for "quintessentially" 
religious purposes or for "pure worship"-must be allowed to participate 
in the limited public forum once it has been opened generally for moral 
and character development, activity pertaining to the welfare of the 
community, or any other enumerated forum purpose that might 
bl b . d . h h I' . h' lXO reasona y e pa1re w1t t ere 1gwus wors 1p. 
The practical effect of the Good News Club court's reasoning is 
evident from the holding and reasoning of the Bronx Household II 
opinion. The district court in Bronx Household II began its analysis by 
noting that the Supreme Court mentioned the Second Circuit in Bronx 
Household I as one of the courts conflicted on the issue of whether 
speech can be excluded from a limited public forum because of the 
religious nature of the speech. 181 The Supreme Court then disagreed 
with the Second Circuit's reasoning in Bronx Household I that 
characterizing activities as religious in nature warranted treating the 
activities differently than secular activities. 182 Additionally, the Supreme 
177. !d. 
178. !d. at 423. 
179. Bronx Household of Faith v. !3d. of Educ. (Bronx Household If), 331 F.3d 342, 355 (2d 
Cir. 2003). 
180. See Austin W. Bramwell, Juris Doc/ores or Doctores /Ji,·initotis: Good News Club v. 
Milford Central School, 533 US WI !2001), 25 HARV. J.L. & PU13. PO!'Y 385,391 (2001 ). Although 
not addressed in this paper, the Bronx 1/ouschold II court's concern over whether groups whose 
v icws are commonly viewed as hateful may be allowed to use the forum for expressive purposes 
comes into play. It would certainly seem that if a group could correlate its activity to a permitted 
forum purpose. it could strongly argue that its exclusion would be on the basis of viewpoint. See 
Bronx Household II, 331 F.3d at 355. 
181. Bronx Household of Faith, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 407 (quoting Good News Club v. Milford 
Cent. Seh., 533 U.S. 98. 105 (2001 )). 
182. !d. (quoting (iood News Cluh, 533 U.S. at 110-11). 
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Court did not think it plausible to draw a distinction between religious 
worship services and other speech from a religious viewpoint. 183 
The majority obviously was aware of, but rejected, Justice Stevens's 
dissent in Good News Club, which would have permitted a court to 
dissect the religious s~eech at issue and categorize it according to its 
nature and purpose. 1 4 Allowing the court to carefully scrutinize 
religious speech, in his view, was especially appropriate in a school 
setting. 185 Justice Stevens saw no problem with letting a public school 
limit the scope of the forum it had created by excluding speech that is 
essentially "worship" or "proselytizing" in nature. 186 The rejection of 
Justice Stevens's proposal sent a strong message (or at least was 
apparently a clear indication) to the Bronx Household II court, which 
faithfully applied the message in its subsequent rulings; when the speech 
at issue is religious, a court should not attempt to dissect or 
compartmentalize the speech in a way that separates religious worship 
f I. . . . 187 rom re 1gwus v1ewpomt. 
Following the Good News Club's reasoning, the district court in 
Bronx Household II also declined to dissect speech and classify it 
d. · 1· . 188 Th . d h f accor mg to Its re Igwus nature. e court pomte out t at some o 
the Bronx Household's activities, like prayer and communion, could 
arguably be termed "mere religious worship," but nevertheless noted that 
some of the church's other activities, such as teaching its members to 
love one another and helping its members and others in the community to 
abandon destructive lifestyles, were clearly consistent with the limited 
forum's express allowance of uses pertaining to the welfare of the 
· 
189 N 'II. h ., f . h commumty. ot WI mg to separate t e two 10rms o expressiOn, t e 
cowi essentially held that as long as a religious group could ground its 
"pure worship" in some permissible forum purpose, both forms would be 
190 
allowed. 
I Xl. !d. (quoting Good News Club. 533 U.S. at Ill). 
I X4. s·ee Good Nell'S C/uh, 533 U.S. at 130-34 (Stevens, J, dissenting); see also supra note 
I 09. Justice Stevens's dissent also recognized that while the government may not restrict speech 
about an authorized topic based on the speaker's viewpoint, it has broad discretion to preserve the 
propc11y for its intended usc by enforcing content restrictions. Good News Cluh, 533 U.S. at 130--31 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 ( 1976)). 
I X5. Good Nnrs Club, 533 U.S. at 133. 
I X h. !d. at 130. 
I 87. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Good News Cluh also noted that the Supreme Court 
has "previously rejected the attempt to distinguish worship from other religious speech" since '"the 
distinction has [no] intelligible content,' and ... no 'relevance' to the constitutional issue." /d. at 
126 (Scalia. L concurring) (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263. 269 n.6 ( 1981 )). 
lXX. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. ofEduc .. 226 F. Supp. 2d 401.421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
189. /d. 
190. The court cmrhasizcd that a "moral" purpose was not necessarily required to prevent the 
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As further evidence of the court's unwillingness to dissect or 
carefully scrutinize the religious speech at issue, the Bronx Household II 
court also rejected, as being precluded by Good News Club, the School 
District's argument that Bronx Household's overall activity, when 
viewed as a whole, was essentially worship because all of the church's 
individual proposed activities, whether marginally worship or entirely 
worship, were "linked by the overarching purpose of religious 
worship." 191 The court noted, as was emphasized in Good News Club, 
that decidedly religious or "quintessentially religious" activities should 
not be treated any differently for purnoses of viewpoint neutrality 
analysis than other permitted activities. 1 2 Again, the message is clear 
that no form of religious activity or speech may be excluded because of 
its substance or nature so long as it is grounded in some permissible 
forum purpose. 
2. Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
In a brief opinion, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
trial court's granting of a preliminary injunction to Bronx Household on 
the grounds that the church was "substantially likely to establish that 
defendants violated their First Amendment free speech rights." 193 The 
court found the district court's reliance on the reasoning of Good News 
Club to be sensible since it found "no principled basis upon which to 
distinguish the activities set out by the Supreme Court in Good News 
Club from the activities that the Bronx Household of Faith has proposed 
for its Sunday meetings." 194 Both groups' activities combined preaching 
and teaching with "quintessentially religious" elements like prayer and 
195 hymns. 
exclusion of the religious worship from the forum. As long as the worship is coupled with an activity 
included in the forum's permitted uses, the inclusion would comport with the Good News Club 
reasoning. !d. at 415 n.X. 
191. !d. The majority also rejects the argument that worship can easily be identified by the 
usual characteristic of having ritual or ceremony. Even assuming that l~tct were true, groups such as 
the Boy Scouts and Legionnaires use ceremony and ritual as the foundation for their viewpoints. !d. 
As such, if the church's exclusion was based on its use of ceremony and ritual, it was only because it 
wa-. religious in nature --which is clear viewpoint discrimination. !d. at 416-17. See Lamb's Chapel 
\. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,394 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
192. Bronx Household o(Faith, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 416 (quoting Good News Cluh. 533 U.S. at 
Ill). The court also notes that such an argument had already been rejected by the court in Widmar l'. 
l'ince/11, where the majority specifically rejected the dissent's view that a class of unprotected 
religious speech called "'worship" should be created. !d. (citing Widmar. 454 U.S. at 270). 
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Viewing the similarity between the facts of this case and those of 
Good News Club to be dispositive, the court only found it necessary to 
explicitly affirm the district court's finding that Bronx Household's 
activities, like those of the Good News Club, were not religious worship 
divorced from the teaching of moral values or other permitted 
subjects. 196 As such, it could not be excluded from the limited public 
forum on the basis of the rei igious viewpoint it espoused. 197 A !though 
the court declined to address the district court's determinations that ( 1) 
after Good News Cluh, religious worship cannot be treated as an 
inherently distinct activity, and (2) the distinction between religious 
speech and worship cannot meaningfully be drawn by the courts, the 
court did acknowledge that its previously held view to the contrary in 
Bronx Household I was "seriously undermined" by the Good News Club 
d . . 198 eCJSIOn. 
The court's refusal to review the district court's findings in these two 
areas may be a proper use of judicial restraint, but the issues, whether the 
court chooses to formally address them or not, have already been decided 
in previous Supreme Court decisions, at least in practical effect. On the 
basis of these decisions, the district court in Bronx Household II had no 
trouble deciding that religious worship cannot be treated as an activity 
inherently different from other forms of expression. 199 Likewise, the 
Good News Club opinion and its application in Bronx Household II 
demonstrate that courts are neither well-equipped nor any longer 
. d d' d . ]' . h 200 perm1tte to 1ssect an categonze re Igwus speec . 
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether worship can be 
treated as an inherently distinct activity in Good News Cluh. 201 In 
looking at this question, it is important to remember that the issue 
presented in that case was whether "speech can be excluded from a 
limited ~ublic forum on the basis of the religious nature of the 
speech." 02 In answering in the negative, the Supreme Court specifically 
disagreed with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that 
"characterization of the club's activities as religious in nature warranted 
treating the club's activities as different in kind from other activities 
196. !d. 
197. /d. 
19X. !d. at 355. 
199. !d. at 357. 
200. See supra text accompanying notes 165-169; Widmar v. Vincent. 454 U.S. 263. 269 n.6 
(19R I). 
20 I. Good News Club v. Milt(ml Cent. Sch .. 533 U.S. 9X (200 I). 
202. !d. at I 05. 
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permitted by the schoo1."203 The Supreme Court also termed the Second 
Circuit's attempt in Bronx Household I to distinguish between religious 
viewpoint and worship when morals and character are involved as 
"quixotic."204 Ultimately, the court found no difference between 
quintessentially religious activities such as worship and secular 
. . . 205 
act1v1t1es. 
Twenty years earlier, in Widmar v. Vincent, the Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of whether courts may draw a meaningful distinction 
between religious speech and worship. 206 In that case, the court 
explicitly recognized that worship is a form of speech protected by the 
First Amendment. 207 In so doing, it rejected the dissent's argument to 
the contrary, which would have created a "new [unprotected] class of 
religious 'speech' ... constituting 'worship. "'208 The majority believed 
the dissent's proposed plan to be unworkable because there was no 
indication of when indisputably religious speech such as prayer ceases to 
be "just prayer" and becomes unprotected worship. 209 
This conclusion's continuing validity is evidenced by the majority's 
rejection of the dissenting opinions in Good News Club, which would 
have allowed courts to carefully scrutinize and catelforize the religious 
speech at issue, separating viewpoint from worship. 2 ° Furthermore, the 
majority's description ofthe club's activities, in generic and broad terms, 
shows the court's reluctance to determine "at what point religious 
content [, like worship,] becomes religious viewpoint."211 The 
203. /dat 110-11. 
204. !d. at Ill (quoting Good News Cluh, 202 F.3d at 512 (Jacobs, J., dissenting)). 
205. See Good News/Good Sports Club v. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 1501, 1506-07 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(emphasizing that the Supreme Court has continually "refused to cabin religious speech into a 
separate excludible speech category"): Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Seh. Dist., 508 
U.S 384,393 (1993). 
206. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269-70. 
207. !d. at 270. 
208. !d at 269 n.6. 
209. See id.; see also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 126 (2001) (Scalia, 
J., concurring). A possible distinction between Widmar and the Bronx Household II decisions is the 
differing fora in the two cases. The Widmar court analyzed the free speech issue in light of a 
"generally open forum," Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269, while the Bronx Household II court looked at it in 
light of a limited public tixum. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 2d 401,413 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002). However. the Good News C/uh court analyzing the free speech issue in the context 
of a limited open forum also implicitly reached a similar conclusion in its rejection of Justice 
Stevens's dissent. See c;ood News Cluh, 533 U.S. at 177 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Manning, supra 
note 9, at 871-72. 
210. Gastel. supra note 9, at 182. The author finds the majority's reluctance to draw this line 
problematic because not only is the court "in the business of line drawing," but Justice Stevens's 
dissent proposes an intriguing scheme in which to do so. 
2 I I. !d. at 181. 
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overgeneralization of facts and the court's refusal to draw the line 
between religious viewpoint and content, such as worship, suggests the 
Supreme Court's willingness to provide increased protection to all forms 
of speech, and specifically religious speech. 212 Finally, the Supreme 
Court's familiar adage again rings true that even if it were possible to 
draw this line, courts are not properly suited to make these fine 
distinctions. Such judicial scrutiny of religious words and practices 
would "inevitably . . . entangle the state with religion in a manner 
forbidden by our cases." 213 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court's precedents in the area of limited speech in 
public fora over the last twenty-five years show the court's increasing 
willingness to grant First Amendment Free Speech rights to religious 
groups, even in such traditionally protected areas as public schools. 
Although the court started modestly in Widmar by merely allowing equal 
access to religious groups when a forum had been generally opened for 
expression, the subsequent cases gradually began to expand the scope of 
expressive and religious freedom for after-school groups using public 
school facilities. Good News Club marked the culmination of this 
expansion of religious freedom when the Supreme Court redrew the lines 
separating church and state and effectively gave religious groups free 
reign to hold meetings and conduct "quintessentially religious" activities 
such as worship on state-owned property. 
If the Supreme Court did not mean to extend the rights of Free 
Speech as far as it did in Good News Club, it must clarify the issues that 
the Bronx Household II court found to be confusing. Otherwise, as the 
Bronx Household II opinion shows, lower courts will interpret the Good 
News Club holding broadly and grant all religious groups access to a 
limited public forum as long as they can pair their "quintessentially 
religious" activities with some permissible forum purpose. In practical 
effect, lower courts will no longer attempt to distinguish religious 
worship from the presentation of religious viewpoint. Whether this will 
positively or negatively impact church-state relations remains to be seen. 
What is clear, however, is that lines between them have been redrawn in 
a way that will affect the American public. 
Kevin Fiet 
212. !d. 
213. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269 n.6. 
